Austin and Palmer

[there] are some cognitive scientists who emphatically stress the centrality of language to thought, although these views are often related more to the powerful role that language plays in forming out minds, rather than the language plays in everyday thought. Daniel Dennet makes the point about cognitive formation that language "infects and inflects our thought at every level... The structure of grammar enforce a discipline on our habits of thought, shaping the ways in which we probe our own 'data-bases'... [W]e can see how the powerful voices that a language unleashes in a brain can be exploited".
-Pg. 95 The Whole Mind, Palmer

“I cannot fix on the hour, or the spot, or the look or the words, which laid the foundation. It is too long ago. I was in the middle before I knew that I had begun.”
-Pride and Prejudice


I'd just like to note that I truly enjoyed the reading by Palmer this week. The idea that grammar and the function of words in sentences, specifically those words which signify mind states, frame our conception in some way of a phenomena is an idea absolutely critical to my analysis of Fantomina and The Female Quixote. Vocabulary and grammar have a way of insidiously framing and directing our thoughts, insidious because it is difficult/impossible just from a definition to know the history of a word, all the conceptions that have been packed into it and perpetuated in culture. We see the tip of the ice burg as a point, as the definition but unknowingly "trail around with a great number of vague generalities"-Jaspers. Words which signify a mind state (as we have continuously observed throughout this class) are not definite structures with right angles which house and contain phenomena but more like some organic environmental structure, eroding and redefining itself at the force of culture over time. I think this quote from Pride and Prejudice is so apt when understanding the language used to signify mind states- "we begin in the middle" and there is an unpacking which allows us to explore the nuances of the phenomena. When we are aware of the framework we can use it consciously, point out the flaws, know what exists outside it- what aspect of the phenomena is unacknowledged? I think about these questions increasingly when considering the language we use to denote psychological phenomena: "schizophrenia" "psychosis" "bipolar" "depressed" etc etc. What does the framing these mind states within the medial paradigm do?

McMahon and Austen

Is unhappiness associated with characters that are uniquely perceptive, or happiness with those whom are portrayed as unskeptical or credulous?

Marquise de Chatlet, confessed in her own Discourse on Happiness, to be happy "one must be susceptible to illusions, for is to illusions that we owe the majority of our pleasures. unhappy is the one who has lost them."
-Pg. 202 McMahon

Elizabeth took up some needlework, and was sufficiently amused in attending to what passed between Darcy and his companion. The perpetual commendations of the lady wither on his hand-writing, or on the evenness of his lines, or on the length of his letter, with the perfect unconcern with which her praises were received, formed a curious dialogue , and was exactly in unison with her opinion of each.
-Pg. 83 Pride and Prejudice

     Elizabeth, who's judge of character we've come to trust, thinks about how "exactly in unison" the conversation proceeds with her "opinion of each". She is distrustful of the superficially gracious Miss Bingley and observes Darcy to be keen and brooding. At this point in the story  Miss Bingley is making exceedingly superficial repetitive observations of Darcy's writing process. Her dialogue is marked with glad/excited explanations throughout. It seems to wear a facade of happiness. On the other hand, Dacy's responses are dry and witty, if he responds at all. He does not seem to express happiness near as much as any of the other characters, throughout the story, but constantly demonstrates his sharp perceptive abilities. It seems that unhappiness in him is associated with a certain "loss of illusion". Furthermore, when we analyze the character of Jane we observe a character that is portrayed as eternally pleasant and happy yet fails to possess any ability to perceive a deeper nature in others, past their unanimous good intentions.

Zunshine

What role does secondary and college education play in our ability to read other's minds? If it is fiction that sharpens this tool, what effect does the pre-medical curriculum have on future doctor's ability to read minds, specifically psychiatrists?

We all learn, whether consciously or not, that the default interpretation of behavior reflects the character's state of mind, and every fictional story that we read reinforces our tendency to make that kind of interpretation first.
-Zunshine, Why We Read Fiction Pg. 4

     Reading this article I couldn't help but be concerned about the current college pre-medical curriculum. If reading fiction is an exercise in developing these tools for mind reading and this skill is fundamental to making psychiatric diagnosis, how are we preparing these future doctors with the skills necessary to succeed at this? While, the ability to read minds is an added benefit to the tool chest of a cardiologist and especially a pediatrician, the ability of a psychiatrist practically depends on it. In psychiatry, there are few biological assays, there are questionnaires yes, but a significant aspect of a psychiatric diagnosis is the interpretations of a individuals behaviors to understand their state of mind. If anything, the premedical curriculum beats the intuition out of you through forcing the repeated regurgitation of strict unequivocal facts such as knowing the enzyme that catalyzes the rate limiting step in the citric acid cycle.

Delusion

Can delusion be conceptualized as an embedded mind state in the individual before the grammatical form of the word, "delusional" existed?

Or when the mid-night Hour is told,
And drooping Lids thou still do'st waking hold,
Thy fond Delusions cheat the Eyes;
Before 'em antic Spectres dance,
 -Pg 23 Anne Finch

We have here a different kind of misinterpretation of the insane, something equally madness as defined by a multitude, but a multitude in ones, ending though, with the same old confirmation of a half-truth. Maria and Yorick walk in together, each supporting the other's delusion.
-Pg. 104 Madness of the Multitude

    A common theme with delusion in the 18th century is it's association with the sensory. It is often conceptualized as being separate from the sensory, however having a downstream effect on it. We also notice when delusion exists separate from the individual. The poem by Finch supports this commonality. "Thy fond Delusions" implies that the individual is in possession of them, rather them being a mind state embedded in the person. Possession of a mind state denotes separation because to possess something, there must be a boundary between the individual and the mind state. I am running into a difficulty with this concept in my paper, while curiosity is described as if embedded in the individual (ie. she is curious); the word that would describe an embedded delusion is "delusional" (as in she is delusional) however the OED doesn't site this word as being used until 1871. The thesis of my final paper rests on the crux that mind states can be framed as embedded and separate from the individual. In curiosity, the grammatical form of the word suggested it's embedded or separateness. I wonder, if I could use the grammatical style used when it is addressed to indicate a state of embedded or separateness.
     The description of delusion follows a description of dreams. Dreams we know, occur in the mind, separate from the senses. There is a contrast between the delusion and dream in the poem because of the word "Or"; however it is not the realm of functioning that seems to be contrasted, but rather the state of consciousness. In dreams, the individual is intruded by shadows during sleep, however during delusion this occurs when "thou still do'st waking hold". "Thy fond Delusions cheat the Eyes" implies that delusions are separate from the eyes, the sensory component, because they are able to perform an action on them, cheat them. Delusion is being framed as separate from the individual and from the sensory.

Final Paper Skeleton

Final Paper Skeleton

Thesis-ish: Contrasting the processes of curiosity and delusion when framed as separate vs. embedded in the subject in the 18th century literature.

Curiosity
-functions within the realm of sensorial:
       -came from an object
       -often associated with senses
-something from the 2ndary readings
-mind states which function within the sensorial will fade with time unless the stimulus changes, curiosity perpetuates itself because of the bi-directionality of the changes between the subject and curiosity
-analogously repeated sensory stimulation causes desensitization of receptor (separate function)
-In Fantomina: processes of curiosity were framed by grammatically separating or embedding the subject and curiosity
-quote from Fantomina about Passion changing the object.

Curiosity as Separate
(ex. her curiosity, a curiosity in her)
-curiosity doesn't change the individual, individual does not change curiosity
-elicits reflexive actions
-intensity of mind state fades over time
-Bauplasir
-Fantomina at first

Curiosity as Embedded
(ex. curious woman)
-curiosity changes individual, individual changes curiosity (bidirectional effect)
-elicits reflective actions
-high intensity of mind state maintained
-Fantomina in the end

Delusion
-DEFINE: a strongly held belief that results in perceptions skewed significantly from those experienced by the majority.
-functions within the realm of ideas:
     -separation between reason and senses in 18th cent. lit
-something from ECCO
-repeated stimulus from mind states that function within the realm of ideas will strengthen idea
-analogous to neuronal networks in brain, learning strengthened by repeated stimuli
-In Female Quixote: processes of delusion were framed by functionally separating or embedding the actions of the subject and the idea/mind state

Delusion as Separate: (frame Arabella's actions as separate from actions of delusion)
-idea changes the individual, individual changes the idea (bidirectional effect)
-elicits reflective actions
-intensity of mind state/idea diminishes
-Arabella after/during cure

Delusion as Embedded: (frame Arabella's actions as equal to the actions of the delusion)
-idea does not change individual, individual does not change idea
-elicits reflexive actions
-intensity of mind state/idea maintained
-Arabella before cure


Conclusion: Despite these two mind states vastly contrasting realms and processes, when framed as  embedded in the subject- they both take on a highly negative force.
    

Wollstonecraft & Montagu

Not even Youth and Beauty can controul
The universal Rancour of thy Soul;
Charms that might soften Superstition's Rage,
Might humble Pride, or thaw the Ice of Age.
-pg. 190 Verses Address'd to the Imitator of Horace

Besides, the reading of novels makes women, and particularly ladies of fashion, very fond of using strong expressions and superlatives in conversation; and, through the dissipated artificial life which they lead prevents their cherishing of any strong legitimate passion, the language of passion in affected tones slips forever from their glib tongues, and every trifle produces those phosphoric bursts which only mimic in the dark the flame of passion.
-pg 275 A Vintication of the Rights of Woman

Tristram Shandy and Spacks

Is the post-modern transition Spacks notes in the use of the word "boring", wherein it becomes a description of an object rather than a subject, observable in other mind states as well?


She is a dreadfully boring woman... The notion that boredom inheres in the consciousness of its experiencer appears to have vanished. Now to call something boring describes an object rather than a subject....A new form of moralizing directs opprobrium toward the cause rather than the victim of boredom.
-Boredom Pg. 22


"Let CONSCIENCE determine the matter upon these reports;--- and then if the heart condemns thee not, which is the case the Apostle supposes,---the rule will be infallible"
[Here Dr. Slop fell asleep]
-Tristram Shandy Pg. 109


Spacks describes a change in the use of the use of the word "boring" that I found similar to changes in the usages of the words "psychosis", "curiosity", "delusion" throughout the semester. She describes them differently; however I think in essence we may be describing the same thing. My papers described a transisiton where psychosis went from being a description of what I call a "process" (where the person is separate from psychosis) to a "mind state" (where the person is indiscernable from the psychosis). We see a change, a person no longer has a psychosis, they are psychotic. Spacks shows an post-modern example where a woman IS bording, opposed to the previous uses of the word we saw in Rambler and Idler where an individual were talking about their experience of being bored. When she states that the word becomes a description of an object rather than a subject, I believe she means in the philosophical sense, rather than the grammatical sense. I explored further the ideas of subject and objects in philosophy; objects are thought of as "entities" and subjects are "observers". In the first post-modern use boring is an intrinsic property of the entity, however in the latter use boring is something the subject observes. When I was describing psychosis as "process" I was specifically noting the distinction separation between the person and the phenomena, in this example the mind state is also describing a subject. When I describe psychosis as a "mind state", I meant to denote the inseparability of the person from the mind state (ex. they ARE psychotic), in this example psychosis is describing an object (one that is intrinsically psychotic). Spacks goes on to describe some of the troubling implications of this switch, when "boring" comes to describe a object rather than a subject; I have seen parallels of this manifestation when many other mind states (specifically psychosis, delusion, and curiosity) are used to describe objects rather than subjects. I wonder if also her criteria concerning the reasons for this change would be explain the factors leading to similar transitions in other mind states.
In the quote from Tristram Shandy, we would have to project the idea that Dr. Slop being bored was the result of his sleep because it isn't expressly said; however if we take that assumption, we see boredom functioning similarly to descriptions in Ramblr and Idler where it is describing a subject, or an external thing that performs a function on the subject.